DEFINING AND DELIMITING INNER SPEECH (1)
Even though inner speech has been characterized in many ways, interestingly, from ancient to recent times the notion that it is a silent manifestation of speech directed to the self\\&$ remained constant. Notice the similitude between Plato’s description of inner speech as “a word spoken . . . to oneself and in silence” (1952, p. 538) and Frawley’s (1997) contemporary portrayal of inner speech as “silent speech for oneself (p. 95). Three elements are essential in this characterization: First, inner speech is spoken language,14 that is, it is language in action rather than language as an abstraction; second, it is silent, that is, it cannot be heard by people who are in the presence of the person experiencing it; and third, it has an orientation to the self, that is, it serves private rather than public purposes.
Whereas these fundamental entailments remain at the basis of most, if not all, definitions of inner speech, it does not seem to be an easy concept to reduce to a fewi words. Vygotsky (1986) himself referred to inner speech in a multiplicity of ways: as “an entirely separate speech function” (p. 235), a “mental draft,” (p. 243), “inner dialogue” (p. 243), “practically wordless ‘communication’” (p. 243), “speech almost without words” (p. 244), “a distinct plane of verbal thought” (p. 248), “thought connected with words,” (p. 249), and “thinking in pure meanings” (p. 249). Sokolov (1972) defined it as “soundless, mental speech, arising at the instant we think about something, plan or solve problems in our mind, recall books read or conversations
heard, read and write silently” (p.l). He also called it “concealed verbalization” and “the speech mechanism of thinking” (p.l). Korba (1989) referred to it as “covert, m/rapersonal language behavior” (p. 219) whereas Morin (1993) equated it with “selftalk” or “internal dialogue” (p. 223). In other instances, inner speech has been interpreted as a “voice in the head” (Beggs & Howarth, 1985, p. 396) and as a rehearsal mechanism supporting interaction between the “inner ear” (auditory imagery) and the “inner voice” (subvocalization) (Smith, Reisberg, & Wilson, 1992).
When defining inner speech, it might be useful not just to include modality in its definition but to characterize it functionally as well as developmentally.15 In other words, inner speech is not simply a silent form of self-directed speech; it is, furthermore, an instrument for thought resulting from the internalization of social speech.
Functionally, two main aspects of inner speech emerge from the different treatments and approaches to inner speech: its cognitive, thinking function and its communicative, talking-to-self role. Whereas inner speech always implies some form of cognitive activity, it may not always be characterized as self-talk. As Vocate (1994b) maintains, for internal self-talk to occur, inner speech must be sufficiently organized in linguistic form, that is, semantically and syntactically elaborated, in order to sustain a conscious dialogue with the self. This notion of self-talk as a distinct mode of inner speech implies a view of inner speech as a phenomenon that occurs in stages or levels of processing, that is, as a progression or movement from thought to external speech and vice versa, involving various levels of semantic and syntactic coding. At some point in this progression, inner speech may be closer to thought than speech; this might be the stage characterized by Vygotsky (1986) as “thinking in pure meanings” (p. 249) or by Sokolov (1972) as “thinking in allusions to words” (p. 122). At another point, inner speech might be more expanded and specific in syntax and meaning; this might be the more propitious stage for “inner talking” or self-talk, as Sokolov (1972) and Vocate (1994b) respectively claim.
Taken From:Inner Speech – L2 hinking words in a second langunge